A History of Air Warfare by Olsen John Andreas

Author:Olsen, John Andreas [Olsen, John Andreas]
Language: eng
Format: mobi, pdf
Publisher: Potomac Books
Published: 2010-01-30T16:00:00+00:00

“ALLIED” AIR POWER?

Yet despite its success, the conduct of the air campaign stimulated fierce debate. In the eight years since Desert Storm, the “air power differential”81 (the capability gap existing between U.S. air power and everyone else’s) had grown ever wider. It created problems of interoperability, generated a controversial dual command structure, and aggravated deep disagreements about bombing strategy, which in a less one-sided contest could have jeopardized the outcome.

The USAF had given priority to new families of PGMs, to development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), to speeding up the information-attack loop, and to all aspects of information warfare. Meanwhile, the European alliance partners, with one or two exceptions, had failed to reinvest in similar weapons and technology. Consequently, while the commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe was able to take great pride in the achievements of NATO air forces in Allied Force, he also noted a significant number of operational deficiencies revealed in the air campaign.82

NATO aircraft had to be able to attack targets on the ground with an accuracy demanded by the rules of engagement in the glare of international exposure, but most could not deliver PGMs. There was a severe shortage of aircraft capable of designating targets for laser-guided bomb attack. Only the United States and, to a much lesser extent, France and the United Kingdom were able to drop precision-guided bombs. Even the United States began to run short of some kinds of PGMs, including cruise missiles, by the beginning of May. Many allied aircraft still required external laser or electro-optical guidance. Dependence on another aircraft for laser designation increased the overall aircraft requirement, complicated mission planning, and could increase the vulnerability of any target-marking aircraft that had to loiter in hostile airspace.

Only the United States possessed all-weather PGMs. The performance of those guided electro-optically or by laser was degraded by cloud, smoke, or bad weather. Over Kosovo, “there was 50–100% cloud cover 72% of the time, and only 21 of 78 days had good overall weather. In all, 3,766 planned sorties, including 1,029 sorties characterized as ‘close air support’ were aborted due to weather. Not until May did the weather become consistently favorable.”83

Some air forces did not have secure air-to-air communications. Target and aircraft position information was frequently vulnerable to Serbian interception. Fortunately, no Serbian aircraft were available to take advantage, and even had they been alerted, autonomous Serbian AD units were unwilling to disclose their locations.

There was no standard “identification friend or foe” equipment. Nor were all NATO aircraft adequately equipped with radar warning receivers (RWR). Some were uncertain which SAM system was illuminating them or even whether the system was hostile. There was no alliance-wide reliable SAM threat warning system. Consequently, operational planners sought to mix different levels of RWR efficiency to provide adequate cover for a multinational package, clearly inhibiting the most effective aircraft involved. General Jumper sought “a reliable and flexible threat warning system, matched to the threats of our adversary.”84

Potential vulnerability was increased by inadequate provision for defense suppression, which the USAF made a prerequisite for all missions.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.